Dallaire Responds to UNAMID

An open letter from the former force commander of the ill-fated UNAMIR mission to Rwanda, to General Martin Agwai, the newly appointed force commander designate for the UN mission in Darfur.

The original can be found here:
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/romeo_dallaire/2007/09/a_daunting_mandate.html


Dear General Agwai

Congratulations on your recent appointment as Joint United Nations/African Union force commander for the hybrid UN/AU Mission in Darfur, formalised by resolution 1769 as Unamid. After over four years of massive killing and displacement in Darfur, a conflict that has not only destabilised Sudan but the entire Eastern Sahel region, Unamid under the leadership of Mr Adada, joint special representative for Darfur, and the force under your command will have the historic opportunity to end slaughter, bring peace, [and] allow humanitarian aid. In the longer term, Unamid has the potential to facilitate the return of Darfur's people to their homes, enhance Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity and stabilise the region.

This is a daunting mandate, and you enter into this mission facing long odds. The intentions of the regime in Khartoum toward an effective, impartial implementation of the Unamid mandate are deeply uncertain. The Sudanese government has blocked and whittled international efforts, through the AU and UN, to end the killing and facilitate a durable peace through fair and transparent internal negotiations. Even since the enactment of Resolution 1769, we have seen ample indications that the Sudanese government will at every turn seek to impose a minimalist reading of the Unamid mandate. The government has already signalled that it will try to restrict the non-African role in the mission as much as it can and prolong the internal divisions and growing chaos which undermine efforts to end the fighting and provide humanitarian aid to all in need.

The challenges you will face in dealing with the rebel movements will also be substantial. In the absence of a viable political settlement process, and exacerbated by the Abuja settlement which many saw as imposed and unbalanced, the groups have fragmented and many elements have degenerated into criminal activity and focus on fighting each other. The same holds true of many "Arab" elements, some of which previously fought alongside government troops. The recent efforts of special envoys Salim and Eliasson have given some hope that this deterioration can be reversed with support from rebel movement leaders and field commanders themselves. But as you know, not all leaders are cooperating and conflict has certainly not diminished on the ground since the recent Arusha meeting. The threat to sustaining humanitarian operations as well as to nurturing the AU/UN-sponsored political talks is obvious and severe.

Finally, assembling, sustaining and directing such a large force in this most remote and inhospitable area will tax you, as it will test the will and capacity of both sponsoring organisations. The Unamid hybrid is conceptually novel, with many practical and legal issues that will impact your work yet to be discovered, let alone resolved. Funding, command and control, reporting and provisioning are all areas where both the location and force size will be taxing, and where the novel character of Unamid will add a difficult layer of challenge for you and the SRSG.

In wishing you well, as a fellow force commander, in your important mission, I would like to take the opportunity to offer a few broad thoughts that I hope may assist you in your preparation and implementation of the mission in the field.

First: I urge you to insist both to New York and to Addis Ababa that they clarify, in the most practical terms and as fast as possible, the chain of command and reporting for the mission. Resolution 1769 is vague on command and control. It did not precisely resolve the well-known disagreement between Khartoum, which insists on essentially AU command, and many other member states, that demand UN command and control as the only guarantor of effectiveness.

For my part, I would press hard for New York to be the headquarters you look to for ongoing guidance and authority to implement the mandate. In practical terms, DPKO has the mechanisms to give you guidance and respond to your urgent requirements at any time, whereas the AU headquarters does not, and DPKO also has long and hard-won experience in supporting missions in the field. At the same time, you will want to ensure that Unamid and DPKO itself integrate the AU secretariat into that process, so that its views and interests are dynamically engaged in your support. Above all, you and SRSG Adada will need to demand from both the UN and AU that they reject undue Sudanese government interference in the implementation of Resolution 1769 regarding command and control, and indeed in your operations.

Second: To succeed in the task given you, it is evident that you must exercise, and insist on, the broadest reading of the mandate given in resolution 1769 (especially operative paragraph 15) concerning your chapter VII authority. We are already seeing efforts by the Sudanese government and its friends to argue that the chapter VII authority extends only to force protection situations and support for the execution of the Darfur peace agreement. But the plain text of the resolution and the intent of the security council clearly are that Unamid should play an active role not only in maintaining peace, but also in protecting the vulnerable civilian population.

The security council's intent flows from those aspects of the Darfur conflict which have set it apart as an international concern of special priority - notably, the massive, purposeful death and displacement at the hands of government forces and their janjaweed militia creation. Those attacks burdened the African Union Mission (Amis) and cast in stark relief its lack of mandate and practical inability to intervene against even the most egregious and predictable attacks on civilians. The Sudanese government has indicated that it does not want Unamid to exercise its chapter VII authority to protect civilians. That cannot be accepted. It would render Unamid a nullity regarding the most fundamental reason for its creation.

Third: All are agreed that Unamid will benefit from having "a predominantly African character," but you must insist that member states with sophisticated capacities provide quickly, and with no political obstruction from Khartoum, what you need to make your force mobile and capable of extending its reach throughout Darfur. So far, a number of African countries have made significant and encouraging commitments. It is beyond dispute, however, that African states themselves simply cannot provide nearly 20,000 qualified troops (nor enough police). Unamid needs attack helicopters, engineers, big cargo lorries, communications and other capabilities that African states also cannot provide.

So far, the UN member states that can provide such capabilities have been slow to do so. I therefore encourage you to reject assertions that the AU has already committed, or could provide, all the needed military forces. Equally, you should bring great pressure, working with the senior UN and AU leadership, to pressure more resource-rich member states to provide the specialised capacities you need. And if Khartoum seeks to discourage meaningful non-African contributions, I urge you to take active exception in the interest of succeeding in your difficult task.

Fourth: Press for progressive deployment of the force, as elements are recruited and prepared. Resolution 1769 sets ambitious target dates for establishing Unamid's operations headquarters, for taking command of the support packages and support for Amis, and for assumption of command authority from Amis. Ranged against those targets are the real challenges of rapid mobilisation and deployment of national troop contributions to Unamid.

The thrust of the resolution is correct in practical as well as policy terms, but the period from now until full Unamid deployment will be a testing one and in many ways the determining period for the mission's success or failure. Previous Amis commanders have made clear their assessment that getting more troops on the ground will shift the balance of authority toward the peacekeepers and away from the spoilers. With a progressive deployment, Unamid can foster a gradual shift in the balance of power in Darfur, which will enhance the longer-term prospects for its effectiveness. In this regard, you will want to maintain pressure on both the UN and AU headquarters to build your needed camp and other logistical facilities as fast as possible, and to monitor Sudanese government interaction with Unamid and the camp construction contractors to ensure that any delaying manoeuvres are quickly identified, reported to New York and Addis Ababa and made a priority for diplomatic intervention.

Fifth: Be vigorous and frank, both in your official reporting to New York and Addis Ababa, and in your public commentary, concerning your achievements and the challenges and obstacles you encounter. It is important that your official reporting, in describing progress on mandate implementation, should highlight obstacles you face that require action by the two headquarters, or by member states. You can anticipate being let down by everyone on whom you depend for support, be that troops, funding, logistics or political engagement. Only by shining a spotlight on those failures in every possible way can you mobilise the attention necessary to get the action you need. Bear in mind that whoever fails you will, in the end, be the most active in blaming you for whatever goes wrong.

Permit me to conclude, general, by wishing you every success in this most challenging and important assignment.

Sincerely,

Senator/Lt General Roméo Dallaire

Chinese Peacekeepers Preparing for UNAMID

Chinese Peacekeepers training for deployment with UNAMID.

About half way through they demonstrate their willingness to lay down their lives in the completion of their mission, oh.. no actually, news just in, they are demonstrating the approved response to opposition from the government of Sudan.

Darfur from Humanitarianism to Development

My experience is that the reluctance of international efforts to shift from humanitarian rhetoric to developmental or to provide substantial support to political processes is closely associated with institutional competition between INGO and the bilateral/multilateral agencies. Part of the problem is that the most influential actors on Darfur within Western polities are INGOs. With popular support mobilised through emotive advocacy campaigns these organisations are able to inflict real political costs on democratic politicians. The problem is that INGOs are effectively tied to humanitarian work, lacking the political mandates and the resources to effectively support a political process or become deeply involved in developmental planning.

As a result, their work, although essential and highly effective, restricts the majority of their advocacy within Western countries to emergency relief or crisis intervention. Using Durkhiem's distinction between profane and the sacred, these campaigns thus portray the political work of conflict resolution as profane, rather than the sacred purity of humanitarian action. This emphasis is in turn is passed on, through the capitals of donor countries, to set the priorities for embassies and international agencies.

The substantial problem here, however, lies in international institutions – the UN and the World Bank are frequently, unwilling or unable to make strong, public cases for the support for political processes. Instead of leading on issues, they often follow - despite their vast budgets often receiving good analysis.

Beyond Darfur the most important example of such an issue is the upcoming elections in 2009. At present, no single agency or NGO, with the exception of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (I have no affiliation) and the British Embassy (again no affiliation), are taking an effective lead on preparing for these elections. The first since 1986, it is estimated that 60% of the population has never voted before and I have frequently encountered basic misconceptions on the nature of democracy/elections within Sudan. Most disturbingly, the perception that elections are purely conflict resolution mechanisms between parties – with no real appreciation of the secondary functions of democracy such as protection of minority rights and checks and balances. As a result, the risk of violent conflict, within the centre of Sudan around the elections is growing, with very few international actors prepared to act in any way to reduce this likelihood.

The largest failure here is UNMIS – who consistently refers to its mandate to legitimize its failure to address elections effectively. This failure is a perfect example of why a UN force in Darfur, regardless of composition, is unlikely to be able to improve the situation, as like UNMIS it will lack political will to effectively address political problems. Instead it will adopt humanitarian functions that allow it to be well portrayed in the international media, whilst neglecting the messy, profane and essential work of political activism.

Darfur II

As has been said for years, Darfur is a symptom not a cause of a deeper crisis. Here we have a presentation of the problems that are emerging in the north.

"Tensions have been high here since soldiers opened fire on an anti-government protest of 5,000 Nubians in June, killing four young men and wounding nearly two dozen. The government has arrested nearly three dozen Nubian leaders and four journalists who were trying to cover the violence.Now a recently formed rebel group, calling itself the Kush Liberation Front, is advocating armed resistance to overthrow the central government, which it accuses of oppressing Nubians and other indigenous peoples in Sudan."Our efforts will not succeed unless they are backed by military action," said Abdelwahab Adem, a Nubian former businessman and co-founder of the Kush Liberation Front. "We need to get rid of the Arabs. Our goal is to realize a new Sudan, by force if necessary."Adem said the new movement would rely on "guerrilla fighting," targeting the capital, Khartoum, and other major Sudanese cities. He declined to specify what sort of tactics might be used or how many fighters the group has."

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nubia31aug31,1,7269074.story?ctrack=1&cset=true

This is all taking place thousands of kilometres away from Darfur. Whilst diplomats nod their heads, they are unable to convince politicians back in London, New York or Beijing, to invest political capital in lobbying for medium-term reform of the central government.

Interview with Hassan al-Turabi, September 3rd 2007.

Al-Jazeera interview with Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's most influential Islamist movement and Speaker of Parliament until 2001. Turabi appears to find events in Darfur hilarious. "The government did not order them to commit genocide, but [chuckling] they are wild people." He also shows some remarkable compassion for the hardships of hybrid force. God forbid that they get too hot. "We don't need to exert on humanity to bring in their soldiers, into to a different country, and a different climate, and to die for us."

Mahmoud Mamdani, Blue Hatting Darfur

Uganda's Columbia University Professor is back again with another broadside on the international community's efforts in Darfur.

"‘The AU has become part of the conflict,’ Mohamed Saley, the leader of the JEM splinter group that allegedly abducted the AMIS patrol in October 2005, told Reuters at the time. ‘We want the AU to leave and we have warned them not to travel to our areas.’ Trying to keep the peace in the absence of a peace agreement made the AU ‘part of the conflict’. There is no reason to believe that the fate of the UN will be any different. To strengthen the mandate in the absence of a political agreement is more likely to deepen than to solve the dilemma. To enforce the ceasefire will mean taking on the role of an invading – and not a peacekeeping – force. Darfur, which is a bit smaller than France – and larger than Iraq – will surely require a force of more than the 26,000 currently planned by the UN."

And more specifically on my favoured theme, the inclusion of Sudanese institutions in the relief effort:

"Local voluntary organisations were critical of the growing dependency of IDPs on international NGOs. The representative from El Fasher Call made the point with some bitterness: ‘IDPs are trying to endear themselves to international NGOs but don’t want to deal with national NGOs.’ ‘IDPs don’t believe in anything Sudanese any more,’ a representative from a Fur charity added. One participant from a construction NGO observed that the war had made people adopt a ‘consumer mentality’. The disaffection with INGOs was shared by all local voluntary organisations, regardless of their ethnic affiliation or political inclination. ‘National NGOs lack the capacity to provide necessary services,’ a representative of Sudan Development Organisation explained, not least because they are excluded by INGOs: ‘They make no attempt to acknowledge that we know the ground better, and also the demands of the people. No wonder most national NGOs have been rejected by the IDPs. If international NGOs gave us a chance, people might appreciate us more.’"

Full article available here, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/43158

Darfur in the Arab Press

This is an interesting topic that receives scant attention from Western advocates or audiences

Darfur in the Arab Press
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA35107

"The ongoing massacre in Darfur, which has been raging since 2003, receives scant coverage in most of the Arab media. The few articles that appear on the subject generally minimize the importance of reports on the ethnic cleansing in the region, [1] and most of them characterize the international efforts to stop the bloodshed in Darfur as a Western, American, or Zionist plot aimed at seizing the country's natural resources. [2] Furthermore, the extensive coverage of Darfur in the Western media is portrayed in these articles as an attempt to divert the attention of international opinion from events in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority, and Somalia.

Nonetheless, on occasion some sharply critical articles are published which condemn the Arab media's indifference to the events in Darfur. [3] These articles urge the Arab countries to drop the conspiracy theories and support the international community's efforts to stop the bloodshed in the region."

Palestinian Cartoon

Palestinian Cartoon



On right: "Nakba of 1948." On left: "Nakba of 2007."

Above and underneath rifle on left: "[Security] Anarchy" and "Internal Fighting."

Source: Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, Palestinian Authority, May 15, 2007

The Dangers of Peacekeeping in Darfur

The world is waiting on Darfur. It is expected that UN peacekeepers, under the heavy package deal agreed with Khartoum, will be dispatched soon. It is believed that their presence will substantially reduce violence between rebel and government forces. It is believed that they will protect the displaced and the defenceless from Janjaweed raids. Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, it is believed that their presence will create the conditions for a post-Abuja political settlement and the deployment of large UN-AU hybrid force. In other words, it is assumed that the deployment of UN forces is the first step towards a sustainable and equitable peace in Darfur.

But what will happen if these assumptions are false, or worse are merely political theatre designed to pacify the street rallies calling for 'something' to be done.

Today in Darfur fighting between rebels and government has almost ceased. Instead we are confronted with a complex layer cake of localised conflicts and banditry. This situation is certainly lethal for Darfur’s residents but it is equally treacherous for any outside force, unlikely to understand the highly localised conflicts currently raging in Darfur. Look at the current international force in Darfur: April has been the deadliest month for the African Union since their deployment, with seven soldiers killed in three attacks. Five it is believed were killed by gun-men from one of the rebel factions.

The failures of the AU are blamed on their expertise and capacity, which are certainly limited. But what if the reality is that no military force, regardless of mandate or capacity can end this conflict, what role will peacekeepers then serve?

Instead of bringing stability to Darfur, there is a real danger than any new peacekeeping force will upset the delicate balances of power that have brought a measure of stability to certain areas of Darfur and trigger new violence both against itself and against the population. The current situation in Darfur has been created by Khartoum. Its decisions in 2004 to pull police and military forces out of rural areas and to arm the Janjaweed militia has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, and left millions destitute. However, Khartoum’s decision was not to fight a war by other means but, particularly since its massive defeats during the September campaign of 2006, it was to make Darfur ungovernable by any party. It chose to create a hell that neither it nor any one could control. Since it achieved this it has sat and watched Darfur burn. At present Khartoum has the strategic upperhand - it has checked the rebels advance - hence there apparent willingness to bend to international pressure at the moment. But it has lost tactical control on the ground, and the danger is that it the UN peacekeepers will be forced to play this role as they seek to protect civilians and humanitarian agencies alike. Thus, they will be doing the government's work.

Peacekeepers were necessary in 2003 and in 2004. They were necessary in 2005 and probably in 2006. But we are too late. ‘Never again’ has become, ‘once again’. We must not compile our mistakes with another. Introducing UN peacekeepers into Darfur is a fools errand. To bring security in the middle of any war, normally means consolidating the authority of the actors that are already present – at present the dominant actor is the government in Khartoum. Peacekeepers faced with a baffling array of rebel groups, factions and militia risk seeking support from the one actor able to offer it, the government. The only solution now of any real effectiveness is to unify the rebels, pressure Khartoum to protect its citizens, and strengthen the African Union.

This is not a good choice, in fact it is a hard, dirty and unpleasant choice. But politics is not about good choices. It is about recognising and taking possibilities. We must not let our dreams cost lives.

Irony

I won't point out the irony of having written a post apologising for the prolonged absence, closely followed by another prolonged absence. Productivity follows the guilt cycle for the modern Northern European. Forget the lapsed Catholic complex, we are dealing with an entire society suffering from lapsed Protestant complex

I wanted to respond to a comment from a friend about the introspectiveness of the previous post. 'Surely', he cried out, 'what is personal frustration in comparison to the good works that must be done', 'the world is an evil place, and if you didn't know this you were naive.' Or something along those lines (he was neither as facile nor as judgemental as I make him sound). Don't read this post as a justification for the previous post. Read it separately as a reflection on frustration here.

In this sector many people have "taken control" of their lives. They have given up many things, relationships, families, stability and often money in exchange for a life that gave them excitement and adventure. But also, and more than this, they asked for a life that gave them meaning, a sense of accomplishment that extends beyond the personal. These people are not in any way adjusted to the amount of governmental control that is exerted over individual lives in contexts like Sudan. When, as in Darfur, aid work is bogged down in a government constructed minefield of delays, procedural obstructionism and moral ambiguity very quickly people begin to think about what they gave up and can become extremely frustrated with their inability to act or change the situation.

This personal frustration is, for many, compounded by wider concerns, precisely because it was these wider concerns that led to people to aid work. A lot of people's frustration in Sudan at the moment, is that they feel the waters rising around this humanitarian Atlantis, and more and more they feel that their jobs and organisations are complicit in its sinking.

The core problem is that yes the world is a bad place, but in situations like Darfur, if you do not go in with a clear idea of what is Right, you will find your operations diverted by what is possible. Organisations have to choose moral barricades that they will fight for or risk having their operations eroded. Abandoning these barricades is a slippery slope on which means become ends. In other words we start counting how many bags of wheat were distributed rather than how many people ate, we start using all of our influence to send peacekeepers rather than asking how the hell they are might to solve the problem.

Some NGOs, like Save the Children or Oxfam, are highly reflective. They look dispassionately at their own operations and critically reassess their work. These organisations are the ones I look up to, not just for their technical expertise, but also for their ethos and leadership. Other organisations, the UN and the World Bank, are pathologically unreflective. Criticism is dodged by referring to the divisions of the Security Council, weak mandates or lack of coordination.

Here in Sudan, the UN has constructed from scratch a vast complex the size of three football fields to house its HQ. The UN has access to the highest ranks of the Sudanese bureaucracy and it has sources of information that NGOs dream of. And yet, with all of this, the UN suffers from a tremendous lack of moral courage. Everything the UN seems to do is a compromise in which it appears to be the losing party - it never fights, even when its staff is beaten, or its operations rendered subservient to government interests. It is a powerful beast that allows itself to be bound, in exchange for the right to posture. As a result, the single most powerful actor in humanitarianism is often the very actor that lets the lions into the coliseum.

Don't get me wrong, I am not calling for a crusader organisation, a multilateral Amnesty International which bears down on a crisis with frothing outrage. To understand the emergency situations of this world you must be a cynic. But you must be a cynic with moral clarity.

My apologies

Dear all,

Sorry about the extended delay in posting. I returned to Sudan in the middle of February and simply found picking up the strings of my job, as well as a whole raft of other work took the energy I had been dedicating to blogging. This hopefully won't happen again.

I think their is another reason why I am blogging again - frustration.

When I first returned everything seemed possible and probable. Plans were made, next steps scheduled and strategies put into motion. I was enthusiastic and optimistic. A month and a half later I find that despite the paper created, the workshops attended and the flip chart/white boards filled nothing has changed. Even if our project had the impact on the ground that I would like, still this would not essentially change anything. People would still by dying or living destitute in Darfur. The rebels would still be criminally incompetent, and the government would still be intent on the destruction of all potential challengers to its own hypocritical authority.

I am beginning to believe that the naivety required to be a humanitarian, is in fact a deeply cynical adventure. By pretending that good actions in a bad world can make a difference we are in fact avoiding the much starker and darker reality that if we really want to stop events like Darfur we must be political, partisan and involved.

The problem with recognising this, is that I am confident that we cannot maintain our own moral purity if we do this.

The Iron Fist closes around the Throat of the Humanitarian Sector

Below are three extracts from the government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission’s (HAC) draft procedures manual. I have put the most disturbing passages in italics.

This document constitutes the final legal stripping of almost all autonomy from both NGOs and INGOs, the main humanitarian actors in Sudan. HAC officials, many of which are believed to be internal security agents, will now be involved in the vetting of all reports, programming, and hiring. They will even be providing the maintenance engineers for humanitarian communications equipment.

There is supposedly a workshop held by HAC in Khartoum to discuss these procedures tomorrow 13 Feb. But this discussion will be pointless - no NGO can object forcibly to these procedures without risking their programming, staff and registration.

8.1 Recruiting Procedures of National Staff:
- Approval of HAC.
- Approval of Labor Dept. (LD) to advertise for the position in local newspapers.
- Payment of the advertisement fees.

N.B.:
All the above mentioned steps take only one day time.

Advertisement time limit takes 10 to 15 days.
The advertisement should specify clearly position’s duties, responsibilities, qualifications and the necessary logical experience etc).
- Applications should be only received by the Labor Dept. (LD) at HAC.
- Preparation of preliminary short list jointly by both Labor Dept. and the organization within one day time.
- Written test within two days time.
- Oral interview and determination of both the successful candidate and the reserve candidate if there any through a joint panel including one member from each of the following:
1. Labor Dept.
2. NGO general Directorate.
3. The concerned NGO.
4. Procedures Technical Dept.
The selection process takes only one day time based on the readiness of the organization to follow the above mentioned steps unless agreed by the joint panel for going into any further steps.

16. Procedures for Conduction of Surveys and Field Assessments:
All NGOS who are going to carry out any Surveys or field Assessments at either federal or state levels should apply the following procedures:
• The surveys/ field Assessments must be directly related to the nature and field(s) of the NGO work
• Involvement of the related technical Governmental department at federal and state levels within the whole process.
• Involvement of the related Governmental Bodies in writing of the survey final reports results and findings
• Unless approved by HAC, release of the survey findings and results is totally prohibited.

13. Procedures of Media Delegation and Media
Coverage:
· A letter from the organization which includes details and purpose of Media
Delegation.
· The organization shall undertake in writing that the Media Documentary Materials shall be only for humanitarian purposes and not for commercial or any other purposes.
· Approval by the External Information Department, Ministry of Information.
· Submission of copy of the concerned document to HAC prior to any release for approval.
· Written approval of the documentary material by HAC before any further step for the release.

The Devil on Horseback

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Even the Region is fed up with Bashir...

This is an interesting piece of news. Not widely known in the EU and US, but Egypt has been a key historical power player in Sudan. It notably supported Nimieri's coup d'etat 1969 and was originally supportive of the 1989 coup (before they discovered that the Islamist NIF was behind it). Egypt and Sudan were once a unified province and Egypt still looks South and sees a recalcitrant, little brother that needs to do what it is told.

For years Egypt opposed an independent South Sudan. Gaining Egypt's agreement to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was an essential step to its succesful negotition and then signature - and this required international guarantees. Egypt now opposes the government's stance in Darfur and supports the deployment of UN troops - your move Bashir.

Egypt, Sudan postpone meeting among silent crisis
Friday 9 February 2007 05:10.

By Wasil Ali

Feb 8, 2007 (The fifth meeting of the joint Egyptian-Sudanese committee’s that was scheduled to be held in Khartoum mid-February was unexpectedly postponed until March, a London based newspaper has reported.

The daily Al-Hayat was quoting an unidentified senior diplomat as saying that there is a "silent diplomatic crisis evolving between the two countries".

Sources close to the Sudanese government told al Hayat that this is the second time that the Egyptian side has requested rescheduling of the meeting since 2005.

The same source was quoted as saying that there has been growing negative sentiments from Cairo towards Khartoum since the mini-summmit held in Libya last month that was boycotted by the Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

The source noted that the Egyptian-Libyan stance al-Bashir’s presidency of the African Union has forced him to withdraw his candidacy. (ST)

A case where America's 'bluster-politik' might work

These measures have the potential to be more effective than are otherwise forthcoming. Damn sight better than the EU is able to muster - and I am an EU national.

Bush approves plan to pressure Sudan - WP
Wednesday 7 February 2007 16:22.
By Glenn Kessler,
Feb 7, 2007 (WASHINGTON) — President Bush has approved a plan for the Treasury Department to aggressively block U.S. commercial bank transactions connected to the government of Sudan, including those involving oil revenues, if Khartoum continues to balk at efforts to bring peace to Sudan’s troubled Darfur region, government officials said yesterday.
The Treasury plan is part of a secret three-tiered package of coercive steps — labeled "Plan B" — that the administration has repeatedly threatened to unleash if Sudan continues to sponsor a campaign of terror.

Some aspects of Plan B have already been stealthily launched, such as stationing four U.S. Army colonels last month as observers on the Sudan-Chad border in full view of Sudanese intelligence. The unannounced move was intended as a signal to Khartoum, which the administration accuses of launching a "quiet war" against Chad’s government to widen the Darfur conflict.

Andrew Natsios, Bush’s special envoy to Sudan, tomorrow will testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the administration has set three triggers that would result in the enhanced sanctions: one, renewed attacks on displacement camps or driving nongovernmental organizations from Darfur; two, stonewalling peace negotiations with rebel forces; and three, refusing to implement a plan pushed by then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to expand a poorly equipped 7,000-person African Union force into a hybrid A.U.-U.N. force of 17,000 troops and 3,000 police.

Buoyed by booming oil wealth and a close relationship with China, Sudan has shrugged off repeated threats of action. Bush, increasingly frustrated by the impasse, approved key aspects of the plan last month, directing Treasury to come up with a menu of options that would directly affect the government in Khartoum, officials said. ... Sudan’s economy is largely dollar-based, meaning many commercial transactions flow through the United States and making it especially vulnerable to Treasury actions. Indeed, U.S. intelligence, which has stepped up reporting on Sudan in recent months to prepare for a confrontation, believes Khartoum set up a government committee to explore ways of obtaining oil revenues that did not involve dollars, such as barter deals, one official said. Sudan’s government has also unsuccessfully sought new oil contracts that would provide for large upfront payments.

Officials hope a ripple effect of Treasury’s actions would extend to other countries and companies doing business with Sudan, forcing them to reconsider whether they want to be tainted or, more troubling, subjected to Treasury’s scrutiny. "Anything that is controlled by the government we can go after," a senior administration official said. "But the effectiveness will be driven by the participation of our partners," meaning other countries.

Sudan produces about 500,000 barrels of oil a year, which at current market rates is worth about $10 billion. As much as 200,000 barrels are kept for internal consumption, Morrison said, with about 75 percent of the rest sold to China. Partly because some aspects of the plan are still classified, administration officials yesterday were vague about how the plan would cripple Sudan’s oil revenues. One official said Treasury will "have the ability to touch things that touch oil revenues."

The regional government of South Sudan, created through a peace deal two years ago, is supposed to get 50 percent of oil revenues. Officials said they think they had designed the plan so it would harm Khartoum but without impacting the government in the south.
(The Washington Post)

China's Long-term Interests in keeping Business, Business

Not sure about the etiquette of cross posting (if anyone does let me know) - but I wanted to extend on a comment I previously made on the great Sudanwatch blog - below is their original post.

Sudanese President is convinced China has never been, will never be tool for US pressure on Sudan - see Middle East Online today: Beshir denies Chinese pressure on Darfur - excerpt:

"The Chinese president did not convey any US demands on the situation in Darfur during his recent state visit to the Sudan," Beshir told the independent Al-Sudani daily.Beshir said that during their meeting last Friday, Hu had asked him to "continue implementing the Abuja agreement and working to improve the situation on the ground".

Hu :renewed his commitment to offering full support to my government to enable it to implement its declared Darfur programme, particularly after he was briefed on our position which advocates dialogue and a peaceful settlement"."Our conviction is that China has never been and will never be a tool for US pressure on Sudan," Beshir told Al-Sudani.

Washington -- which accuses the Sudanese regime of genocide in Darfur -- sent envoy Andrew Natsios to Beijing last month to seek increased diplomatic coordination with Khartoum's key ally.

My Comment:
As the Chinese have said on several occassion - 'Business is business'.

This is more than a statement of Chinese policy on Sudan, it is a much broader act of public diplomacy directed at all current and potential trading partners. By declaring that China will not raise issues of governance or human rights in Darfur, they are affirming to all other possible partners with dodgy governments that they can rely on China.

China's neutral stance on the politics of business partners is their competative advantage in the international economy. It has allowed them to penetrate sectors in which they are not technically or economically internationally competative.

The oil sector in Sudan is a perfect example of this. China's petroleum sector was underdeveloped and widely believed to have been immature. It is widely believed that Sudan could have extracted significantly more oil, more quickly and more profitably had they partnered up with Western companies. Thus by refusing to engage in political discussions with Sudan they have been able win concessions that otherwise would not be available to them. In the process they have been able to learn by doing and improve their extractive sectors - the cost for the Sudanese has been high.

The same kind of deal goes for many of Chinese actual and potential business partners - 'take us, we are worse at doing the job, but we won't complain about your internal politics.' I believe that China's intractability over Darfur reflects Beijings fear that if they shift away from their 'no politics' stance publicly in Sudan they risk their current and future relationships with many other countries. And with it their future energy security.

As a result, I think Bashir is probably right that China will not back down unless they are offered some serious carrots.

The Coming Storm?

UN staff warned against high risk of terrorist attack in Sudan

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in Sudan has issued last Wednesday 31 January an alert of imminent attack against western interest from an extremist group in Sudan.

The U.S. embassy in Khartoum has warned Americans in Sudan of an imminent insurgency strike by an Islamist group. In a warden message on Thursday, the embassy said it was informed by the United Nations Mission in Sudan that an "extremist group based in the country is likely to target Western interests."

The UN alert indicated that threats of this nature must always be taken seriously and staff are therefore requested to remain vigilant and alert.

"Given the focus of extremists on the UN presence in Sudan, it is possible that the primary target of this threat is the UN," the US embassy n message said.

The Sudanese government does not confirm the threat cited in the warden message. But UN diplomats have warned of increasing threats by al-Qaeda and other Islamic fighters against the Western presence in the country. (ST)

It is sad to say but most analysts have been waiting for this warning. The first signs of a growing terrorist threat in Sudan came in September 2006 when Mohammed Taha, the editor of al-Wifaq newspaper, was decapitated by an unknown Islamist group. The Sudan government used to be very effective at monitoring and controlling Islamist groups (those that adopted positions more extreme than their own I mean). Its Islamist credentials gave it access to the information and sympathisers necessary for this kind of work. In recent years their ability to do this has been eroded.

What is worrying is that any terrorist attack is likely to be only a precursor of a wave. After fifteen years of government-sanctioned radicalisation extremist Islamist networks have a fertile recruitment ground amongst fringe elements in Sudan. Sudanese nationals have been detained in Afghanistan, crossing into Israel and other frontline states.

At the moment very few international organisations have protection - the UN and World Bank both have Bremer blocks and walls guarding compounds but many NGOs are vulnerable. These defences a double edged sword - whilst they provide protection, they also really do alienate the population. It is hard to convince the Sudanese that the the West does not seek to recolonise the country when all of our offices are surrounded by barbed wire, security gates, and heavy concrete blocks.

Developing Civil Society

This is a vital measure - at present millions of dollars of aid money have been poured into Darfur. The national NGO scene has seen almost none of this. The Darfur Net - a network of 0 odd NGOs scattered through the three states of Darfur cannot even afford to buy a single computer.

This is changing somewhat as agencies are realising that they will be pulling out in the next few years - both declining funding and security make this a certainty - as a result they are looking around for national partners they can hand over their programmes too.

World Bank launches initiative to promote Sudan’s civil society action
Monday 5 February 2007 03:30.

Feb 4, 2007 (KHARTOUM) — The World Bank has launched an initiative to promote Sudanese civil society projects for peace and development, a press release said.

World Bank
The World Bank Sudan Country office launched "Sudan Development Marketplace (DM) for 2007" initiative to identify innovative development ideas for delivering results, engage directly with stakeholders working at community level, create a forum of knowledge sharing and dissemination and build partnerships with and between other development actors.
The DM for 2007 aligns with the needs and development perspectives of post-conflict Sudan. The statement said that the theme of Sudan DM for 2007 "Towards an Inclusive Sudanese Society" has been carefully selected to satisfy the aspirations of Sudanese people for peace and development.

The initiative aims to support the recovery and reconstruction efforts in the country through pro-poor and pro-peace initiatives working towards consolidating peace and supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 2005.
The overall competition would be looking for innovations in areas of encouraging community initiatives and collecting actions, reinforcing community identity and culture of tolerance, conflict resolution and peace. In addition to promoting change to address challenges and improve quality of life at the local level.

The projects must focus specifically on the theme, openness of the competition to civil society groups such as non-government organizations (NGOs), foundations, private entities, community based organizations, academic institutions, civic organizations and cooperatives, projects should be implemented within a timeframe of 12 months and budget proposals should not exceed US$ 20,000.

The World Bank also set evaluation criteria for the projects. These criteria include innovativeness, impact, replicability, cost effectiveness and partnerships.

Of bureaucractic hurdles and the procedural 'ring of fire' faced by Humanitarians

In light of the last post I wanted to bring up a further point....

I am currently stranded outside of Sudan and have been for the last four weeks. Whilst I have not been denied a visa it simply is never issued. Similarly before I left Sudan getting work permits, residence permits and travel permits has occupied a vast amount of my and my office's time - significantly delaying our project. Each one of these documents is processed through a bureaucracy that is always extremely inefficient and very often highly politicised. My current situation is simply a microcosm of the very serious obstacles put in front of the humanitarian agencies by Khartoum.

These obstacles affect the core of the basic operations humanitarian agencies are involved in as they restrict access and absorb resources. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the government agency tasked with 'coordinating' the aid effort, is widely seen as the direct opponent of the aid operations and is unanimously believed to be largely staffed by Sudanese state security.

No aid agency working in Darfur can effectively lobby for pressure to be put on Khartoum to remove such restrictions - those who have tried have witnessed a serious backlash. The most recent was the Norwegian Refugee Council who were expelled in November last year.

So why are the politicians not doing this?

Military Intervention

Today's article from the Sudan Tribune is another example of how Western policy towards Sudan is evolving from passivity towards more aggressive pressure. This however, is not following the best direction. Any militaristic intervention, such as the enforcement of a no-fly zone, would not stop the killing, which is largely being carried out by low-tech militias ,nor would it not alter the stakes of the war for the regime in Khartoum. The military advantage such a ban might give to the rebel movements would be negated as Khartoum's logical reaction will be to rely even more heavily on the militias who have been responsible for the majority of war crimes in Darfur. This kind of intervention is, also, very likely to provoke a response against the humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur. These agencies are extremely vulnerable to government policies changes, and several flights, including a medical evacuation, have been refused by Khartoum for security reasons.

See this article by Alex de Waal for a very good description of why any military intervention risk backfiring dangerously on the vulnerable populations of Darfur.

Sudan Tribune, Sunday 4 February 2007 00:30.
By Wasil Ali
Feb 3, 2007 (LONDON) — Britain sent a strongly-worded warning to Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, urging him to accept the deployment of hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur or else Khartoum will face unspecified coercive measures.
Lord Triesman, the British minister in charge of African affairs told BBC Arabic Service that the world will not stand still while atrocities occur in Darfur.
Triesman further added that the world will not allow massacres similar to those of Rwanda, when the international community has been unable to intervene during the genocide that took place there in 1994.
Lord Triesman refused to rule out the possibility of direct military intervention against the Khartoum government, but he said that any move requires the approval of both the United Nations and the African Union.
The Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has previously said that he agrees to the hybrid force proposal but sckepticism remained on his interpretation of the plan.
Prime Minister Tony Blair discussed last December with the US President George Bush plans to impose a no-fly zone over Sudan’s Darfur region while military planners in Washington are also developing plans for air strikes and a naval blockade to pressure Khartoum to stop the violence, the Financial Times reported.
He told President George W. Bush that they had to deal with Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, in the next two to three months, if rapid progress is not made.
(ST)

On the Mindless Menace of Violence by Robert Kennedy

I was sent this the other day and think that it is as relevant today as it was in 1968.

City Club of Cleveland, Cleveland, OhioApril 5, 1968

This is a time of shame and sorrow. It is not a day for politics. I have saved this one opportunity, my only event of today, to speak briefly to you about the mindless menace of violence in America which again stains our land and every one of our lives.

It is not the concern of any one race. The victims of the violence are black and white, rich and poor, young and old, famous and unknown. They are, most important of all, human beings whom other human beings loved and needed. No one - no matter where he lives or what he does - can be certain who will suffer from some senseless act of bloodshed. And yet it goes on and on and on in this country of ours.

Why? What has violence ever accomplished? What has it ever created? No martyr's cause has ever been stilled by an assassin's bullet. No wrongs have ever been righted by riots and civil disorders. A sniper is only a coward, not a hero; and an uncontrolled, uncontrollable mob is only the voice of madness, not the voice of reason. Whenever any American's life is taken by another American unnecessarily - whether it is done in the name of the law or in the defiance of the law, by one man or a gang, in cold blood or in passion, in an attack of violence or in response to violence - whenever we tear at the fabric of the life which another man has painfully and clumsily woven for himself and his children, the whole nation is degraded. "Among free men," said Abraham Lincoln, "there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet; and those who take such appeal are sure to lose their cause and pay the costs."

Yet we seemingly tolerate a rising level of violence that ignores our common humanity and our claims to civilization alike. We calmly accept newspaper reports of civilian slaughter in far-off lands. We glorify killing on movie and television screens and call it entertainment. We make it easy for men of all shades of sanity to acquire whatever weapons and ammunition they desire. Too often we honor swagger and bluster and wielders of force; too often we excuse those who are willing to build their own lives on the shattered dreams of others. Some Americans who preach non-violence abroad fail to practice it here at home. Some who accuse others of inciting riots have by their own conduct invited them.

Some look for scapegoats, others look for conspiracies, but this much is clear: violence breeds violence, repression brings retaliation, and only a cleansing of our whole society can remove this sickness from our soul.

For there is another kind of violence, slower but just as deadly destructive as the shot or the bomb in the night. This is the violence of institutions; indifference and inaction and slow decay. This is the violence that afflicts the poor, that poisons relations between men because their skin has different colors. This is the slow destruction of a child by hunger, and schools without books and homes without heat in the winter. This is the breaking of a man's spirit by denying him the chance to stand as a father and as a man among other men. And this too afflicts us all.

I have not come here to propose a set of specific remedies nor is there a single set. For a broad and adequate outline we know what must be done. When you teach a man to hate and fear his brother, when you teach that he is a lesser man because of his color or his beliefs or the policies he pursues, when you teach that those who differ from you threaten your freedom or your job or your family, then you also learn to confront others not as fellow citizens but as enemies, to be met not with cooperation but with conquest; to be subjugated and mastered. We learn, at the last, to look at our brothers as aliens, men with whom we share a city, but not a community; men bound to us in common dwelling, but not in common effort. We learn to share only a common fear, only a common desire to retreat from each other, only a common impulse to meet disagreement with force. For all this, there are no final answers.

Yet we know what we must do. It is to achieve true justice among our fellow citizens. The question is not what programs we should seek to enact. The question is whether we can find in our own midst and in our own hearts that leadership of humane purpose that will recognize the terrible truths of our existence.

We must admit the vanity of our false distinctions among men and learn to find our own advancement in the search for the advancement of others. We must admit in ourselves that our own children's future cannot be built on the misfortunes of others. We must recognize that this short life can neither be ennobled or enriched by hatred or revenge.

Our lives on this planet are too short and the work to be done too great to let this spirit flourish any longer in our land. Of course we cannot vanquish it with a program, nor with a resolution.

But we can perhaps remember, if only for a time, that those who live with us are our brothers, that they share with us the same short moment of life; that they seek, as do we, nothing but the chance to live out their lives in purpose and in happiness, winning what satisfaction and fulfillment they can. Surely, this bond of common faith, this bond of common goal, can begin to teach us something. Surely, we can learn, at least, to look at those around us as fellow men, and surely we can begin to work a little harder to bind up the wounds among us and to become in our own hearts brothers and countrymen once again.

The Middle East

Five years ago I my studies and embarked on my PhD just as the World Trade Centre attack took place. Every time I reflect on the changes that have occurred in the region that I now call home in this time I am shocked.

Here is a selection of the news today from various news sources:

Greg Myre - New York Times

At least 17 people were killed Friday, including a 7-year-old boy, bringing the total for the past two days to 23. Most of the dead were security force members belonging to Hamas or Fatah, as well as other fighters, but several civilians were also killed.

BBC

At least 102 people have been killed and 215 injured in a lorry bombing at a market place in central Baghdad, Iraqi security officials have said.

Mazen Mahdi - Arab News

Several hundred demonstrators yesterday clashed with authorities after the arrest of two key opposition figures along with a relatively unknown rights activist earlier in the morning. Police reportedly responded with tear gas and rubber bullets.

Daily Star

Iran and the United States continued to blame each other for the raging violence in Iraq on Friday, with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki slamming US "militaristic" policies in the region and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates insisting his country was not planning to wage war against Tehran.

And this is to say nothing of the ongoing, slow news stories in Lebanon, Darfur and Syria. What bothers me is that many very bright people argue that these eruptions of violence are essentialist reactions of religious and ethnic groups to outside interference.

The current turmoil in the Middle East is not the result of homegrown atavism - although the 'ties that bind' shape these conflicts. The conflicts are all fuelled, if not in some cases created, by a newly polarised international order. Unlike the 1990s, when I travelled and lived extensively in the Middle East, the region is again caught up in a Arab Cold War. The 'anti-terror', pro-democracy countries gathered around the US, pitted in indirect and proxy conflicts against the supposedly 'pro-terror' groups such as Hamas, the regime in Khartoum, Hezbollah and Iran. Each of these sides is supplying weaponry, resources and political capital to their chosen allies and fanning the flames of conflict that we see today. The first annual Human Security Report (a must read study of the changing nature of armed conflict) had this to say about the Cold War:

The most persuasive explanation for the decline in civil conflict [during the 1990s] is found in the far-reaching political changes wrought by the end of the Cold War. What were the forces that drove the decline?

First, as already noted, the end of the Cold War removed a major driver of ideological hostility from the international system. This affected civil wars as well as international wars.

Second, the end of the Cold War meant that the two superpowers largely stopped supporting their clients in proxy wars in the developing world. Denied this support, many of these conflicts died out, or the parties sued for peace. But less than 20% of the post–Cold War decline in conflict numbers appears to be attributable to this factor.

Third, and most important, the end of the Cold War liberated the UN, allowing it for the first time to play an effective global security role—and indeed to do far more than its founders had originally envisaged. The impact of this wave of post–Cold War activism on the global security front — which went well beyond the UN — has been both profound and the subject of extraordinarily little study.

If the conflicts in the Middle East are to stop it will require concerted effort on two levels - internationall activists must advocate against the dangerously divisive policies of the war on terror, regionally neutral forums must be created in which meaningful dialogue and negotiated resolutions can replace violence as a bargaining tool. If these two conditions are fulfilled conflict resolution at the national level will have a much greater chance of success.

Chad

The current instability in Chad, with rebel and government forces fighting across the Darfur border, should be a lesson to us all. The debate over international action in Darfur was framed in terms of moral imperative and international obligation. It could, however, been more effectively framed in terms of national interest. Darfur was not only a humanitarian crisis, although it became portrayed as one, but a devastating political crisis threatening to unravel regional order in both Sudan and Chad.

State’s are famously ambivalent about morals. Interests, however, have a more enduring force. Interests do not permit the ambiguities or delays that plagued the Security Council’s response to Darfur, nor do they permit the ineffectual, posturing that characterised Western government rhetoric. They demand immediate and effective action.

Whilst it is important to mobilise people for moral action it is also important to give politicians - institutionally inclined to protect the bottom line - a real motivation to act. A great lever for this, as has been discovered by the climate change lobby, is to tell them pay now or pay much more later.

With the war in West Darfur now part of a regional security complex and cross border rebellions in three states, the cost of re-establishing stability later is going to be significant.

Darfur

The proposed UN-AU hybrid force to be deployed in Darfur is going to have a very rough ride. No peacekeeping force faced with an obstructionist government, an ongoing civil war, a weak mandate and a mixed organisation, has ever succeeded. And yet this small, ambiguous step forwards is being declared a political victory. How did we get to this stage? What exactly has been done to stop Darfur?

The real answer to this question is very little. Samantha Powers appears to be right. When great countries are faced with the moral enormity of genocide the response is public outrage and fierce rhetoric to disguise inactivity and policy failure. Over the last three years the UN Security Council, the US and the EU have alternated between indecision and confusion, whilst Khartoum has been allowed to flout Security Council Resolutions, cease-fires and the protocols of internationally mediated peace deals with impunity. The AU, for a myriad of reasons, has failed, no sanctions regime has been imposed, nor has a no-flight zone. Humanitarian space is not being protected, aid workers are becoming victims in what is now a degrading spiral of atrocity.

Whilst the international debate over Darfur has provided high drama the reality is that no effective political pressure been applied to stop the war. Billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, hundreds of high profile visits and thousands of pages of documentation are nothing but a disguise for the blushing absence of consequent action. A series of completely failed interventions, such as the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in 2006, have been pursued to the bitter end whilst well-known effective measures have not been taken.

The one measure that could now be effective is the enforcement of targeted sanctions against members of the regime, as suggested by the International Crisis Group in their latest report on Darfur. Yet this, the most effective instrument of policy that we have left, is quietly accepted as politically impossible by many of the policy makers within the US and EU.

In comparison Khartoum has firmly and resolutely prosecuted its brutal war. For the security clique that controls Khartoum, no international pressure means that there has been no reason to risk the internal opposition and potential instability that might result from changing policy. Without pressure why risk disarming the Janjaweed who could easily turn their weapons on government soldiers? Furthermore in this era of Iraq and Afghanistan standing up to the West can give a boost of Islamically inclined political legitimacy to even a brutal dictator like Omar al-Bashir.

As a result, in Darfur an estimated 4 million people are now either displaced or destitute, 50% of these are now isolated in rural areas outside of camps were humanitarian services can be provided. The war has spread into Chad and the Central African Republic, both desperately poor countries that came 170th and 171st out of 177 in the World Bank’s World Development ratings in 2006.

This is not a call for any misguided militaristic adventurism. In Iraq the world has learnt (again) that relying on military force to bypass undesirable political realities is a delusional strategy. The resolution to the current problem is, and always has been, political. The international community must create a space in which rebels are able to unifying and prepare for a renegotiation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. To do this it must exert meaningful pressure on the government of Sudan which is actively seeking to fragment the groups.

The reality is that Sudan as a whole is spiralling slowly towards state failure. Whilst the International Community has invested its words and resolutions in Darfur the South of Sudan has been quietly forgotten – without political attention reconstruction funding has been released painfully slowly and the modalities of the CPA have been progressively breached. Whilst many in the UN and World Bank are putting their faith in the legislative and presidential elections to be held in 2009, the Government of South Sudan is spending 40% of its fiscal budget on defence.